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STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
The case in the lower court was in the nature of 
a divorce action which among other things adjudicated the 
property rights of the parties. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court disposed of the issues before it 
as indicated in Appellant's Brief. However, that court re-
fused to address the issue of the homestead allowance since the 
defendant and respondent had individually filed for bankruptcy. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant's Brief addresses most, if not all, of 
the relief sought on appeal. This brief will only address 
part of the relief sought, namely, that the homestead exemption 
should be awarded to the plaintiff and appellant. In the alter-
native, the homestead exemption should be declared to exist, 
and the matter remanded for a determination as to the proper 
allocation of that exemption. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint for divorce 
on or about August 3, 1980, which started this action. 
After some preliminary hearings in this matter, 
defendant filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 on May 20, 
1981. 
The parties agreed that their home should be sold, 
but were unable to agree on how best to effectuate the sale. 
On August 10, 1981, a hearing was held and the 
court ordered that child support payments cease. They were 
not ordered resumed until at least eighteen months later. 
A trial was held on October 1, 1981. In the re-
sulting Amended Decree of Divorce dated December 14, 1981, the 
trial court awarded the parties' home to defendant in order to 
facilitate its sale. 
The trial court placed certain limitations on how 
defendant could sell the home. The court also dictated terms 
for the disposition of the proceeds. 
During the interlocutory period, which by the terms 
of the Decree ended March 14, 1983, defendant's bankruptcy was 
converted to Chapter 7. Plaintiff then filed for record her 
Declaration of Homestead on February 8, 1982. A copy of that 
Declaration is attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
On or about January 8, 1983, plaintiff filed a Motion 
to Reconsider. This Motion asked for increased limitations on 
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defendant's power to sell the home, and for different pro-
visions for distribution of the proceeds. 
On February 26, 1982, the court stated during a 
hearing that before any sale of the home was finalized, it 
would have to be submitted to the court for approval. This 
ruling was embodied in an Order dated March 31, 1982. 
On March 19, 1982, the trial court gave approval for 
a specific sale provided that the entire proceeds of the sale 
were distributed in accordance with a subsequent order of the 
court, or deposited with the court pending such an order. 
In the hearing held on February 26, 1982, plaintiff 
asked the court about a determination as to the proper alloca-
tion of the homestead exemption, since plaintiff had filed her 
declaration. The court refused to consider it at that time. 
(Page 98 of transcript, page 558 of record.) 
In preparation for the time when the trial court would 
consider the homestead exemption, plaintiff filed a Statement of 
Points and Authorities Relevant to the Homestead Exemption, 
dated April 16, 1982. This statement pointed out that the 
homestead exemption would apply to proceeds of the sale of the 
property. 
On or about May 17, 1982, the trial court executed a 
Court Approval of Sale referring to a specific Earnest Money 
and Offer to Purchase. The court made provision for the payment 
of part of the proceeds as necessary to effect the sale, and 
ordered that the "remaining amounts shall be paid to the Clerk 
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of the Court for disbursements according to a future specific 
Order of the Court." 
On May 25, 1983, the bankruptcy court also approved 
the sale of the home, and by June 3, 1982, the home had been 
sold. The trustee in defendant's bankruptcy began collecting 
the said "remaining amounts." 
In a hearing held on August 12, 1982, there was a 
review of the history of the case. 
Plaintiff indicated that the issue of the homestead 
exemption had been raised but not disposed of. 
transcript, page 564 of record.) 
(Page 2 of 
The Judge agreed that he had never intended to award 
all of the equity in the home to defendant for his own use. 
(Page 7 of transcript, page 569 of record.) 
Nevertheless, the issue of the exemption 
was not addressed by the court despite being raised again and 
argued in that hearing by plaintiff. 
page 572 of record.) 
(Page 10 of transcript, 
Finally, on February 4, 1983, plaintiff again raised 
the issue of the homestead exemption. The Judge stated he did 
not chink it was something he was in a position to control, and 
thus declined to decide the issue. (Pages 3 and 4 of transcript, 
pages 650 and 651 of record.) He later emphasized that his 
rulings were to be final. (Page 36 of transcript, page 683 of 
record.) These statements were reflected in the Suoplemental 
Order and Judgment to Decree of Divorce dated March 18, 1983, 
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from which Order and Judgment this appeal has been taken. 
On July 11, 1983, the trustee in defendant's 
bankruptcy, Anna Drake, executed an affidavit confirming her 
position that she would not distribute the remaining proceeds 
of the sale of the home of the parties until this matter had 
been decided on appeal. A copy of that Affidavit of Trustee, 
Anna Drake, is attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. The state court should allocate the 
homestead exemption regardless of the theory of the case. 
There are several logical theories which can explain 
or justify what the state and federal courts have done in this 
matter. Each of these theories leads to the conclusion that 
the state court should allocate the homestead exemption. These 
logical sequences are as follows: 
Theory A: (1) The divorce court did not have juris-
diction to allocate the property of the parties since defendant 
had filed for bankruptcy. 
l2) Plaintiff still had title to an un-
divided one-half interest in the home of the property at the 
time the home was sold. 
(3) The bankruptcy court had no right to 
sell plaintiff's interest, and the sale may be rescinded, OR 
the bankruptcy court's action was justified by the power it has 
to sell the property of a co-owner. 
(4) One-half of the proceeds held by the 
bankruptcy trustee should be paid to plaintiff. 
(5) Plaintiff's share would be exempt from 
process by creditors to the extent of the homestead exemption. 
(6) The state court should decide to what 
extent plaintiff is entitled to the homestead exemption applicable 
to her individual property. 
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Theory B: ( 1) The divorce court had jurisdiction 
to allocate the property of the parties. 
(2) The divorce court awarded plaintiff's 
one-half interest to defendant to hold in trust for plaintiff's 
benefit. 
(3) The bankrupt estate only had bare legal 
title with respect to plaintiff's interest in the home. 
l4) The proceeds of plaintiff's one-half 
interest held by the bankruptcy trustee are not part of the 
bankrupt estate. 
(5) The homestead exemption applies to 
the equitable interest held by the plaintiff. 
(6) The state court should decide to what 
extent plaintiff is entitled to the homestead exemption before 
payment to creditors. 
Theory C: (1) The divorce court had jurisdiction to 
allocate the property of the parties. 
(2) The divorce court awarded the home to 
defendant to take care of creditors. 
(3) The bankruptcy court would recognize 
a homestead exemption applicable to such an award. 
(4) The parties were entitled to a home-
stead exemption. 
(5) The state court should decide to what 
extent plaintiff is entitled to the homestead exemption before 
payment to creditors. 
- 7 -
Point 2. If the tridl court did not hcive JUrisdic-
tion to award the home to defenddnt, it should determine the 
homestead exemption available to plaintiff (Theory Al . 
Cl) Theory A is based on the divorce court not having 
jurisdiction to allocate the property of the parties. 
This basis is consistent with a recent case 
decided by this Court, Rogers v. Rogers, No. 17570, filed 
September 21, 1983. 
On page 4 of that decision, the Court explained 
that the estate of the bankrupt spouse could conceivable include 
some interest, legal or equitable, in all property of both of 
the married parties. The result which followed on page 6 of the 
decision was that the automatic stay applied to any purported 
division of any of the property of either spouse. 
Any actions taken by the lower court in violation 
of that stay would be void. In re Eisenberg 7 B.R. 683, 686 
(E.D.N.Y. 1980). 
l2) If the divorce court's action actually had no 
effect on plaintiff's property, then the bankrupt estate consisted 
of no more than that which defendant had prior to the orders of 
purporting to award him certain real and personal property. 
In re Treiling, 21 B.R. 940, 942-3 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
(3) What defendant actually possessed was an undivided 
one-half interest in the home of the parties. Absent dtlY adJudi· 
cation increasing defendant's interest in the home, all the 
trustee in bankruptcy could sell was a one-half interest in '.:he 
home. 
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However, the trustee sold both spouses' interest 
in the home. 
If the trustee had no right to sell plaintiff's 
interest, then clear title was not conveyed, and perhaps recission 
would be the most appropriate remedy. 
However, the bankruptcy court does have the power 
to sell the property of a co-owner. 11 u.s.c. §363(h). In re 
Bachman, 21 B.R. 849, 851 (W.D.Pa. 1982). And the fact that the 
sale of the home was approved by the bankruptcy court might in-
dicate it had exercised that power. 
(41 If the bankruptcy court was selling the property 
of a co-owner, namely the interest of the plaintiff, then one-
half of the proceeds held by the trustee would be the property 
of the plaintiff. Brown v. Brown, 189 S.W. 921, 923 lKy. 1916)_; 
Mangus v. Miller, 317 U.S. 178, 185, 63 S.Ct. 182, 185, 87 L. 
Ed. 169 ( 1942). 
l5) Since that one-half has not been adjudicated to 
be included in the bankrupt estate, then it is property of the 
plaintiff consisting of proceeds of the sale of a home against 
which a declaration of homestead had been properly filed. 
Section 78-23-4 Utah Code Annotated. 
(6) Either plaintiff is entitled to a homestead 
exemption in the full amount declared, or she is entitled to a 
homestead exemption to the extent allowed by the state court. 
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Point 3. If the trial court validly awarded 
plaintiff's interest to defendant to hold in trust for her, 
there should be a determination as to the homestead exemption 
available to her (Theory B). 
(l) The divorce court and bankruptcy court were 
each aware of the other's involvement. Yet each continued to 
make decisions based on the supposed efficacy of the other's 
jurisdiction. 
Based on the divorce court's award of the home 
to the defendant, the bankruptcy court approved a sale of the 
home. 
Based on the integral involvement of the divorce 
court, the trustee has affirmed that she will not disburse the 
remaining proceeds from the sale of the home until this appeal 
is decided. 
Therefore this Court could well act on the basis 
that the divorce court had jurisdiction to do what it did. 
In re Cunningham, 9 B.R. 70 (D.N.M. 1981). 
(2) As indicated in the Statement of Facts above, 
the trial court did not mean to award all of the equity in the 
home to the defendant. Rather, title was awarded to the 
defendant essentially to facilitate the sale of the home. 
(Page 7 of transcript, page 569 of record.) 
(3) Thus what defendant gained by the decree was 
merely legal title, encumbered by the declaration of homestead 
had been filed before the decree became fi11al. This is, 
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in turn, what would be in the bankrupt estate. In re Treiling, 
21 B.R. 940, 942-3 lE.D.N.Y. 19821. 
(4) Although the initial decree specified that the 
proceeds would be paid to the creditors before it would be 
paid to the parties, it had not addressed the homestead exemp-
tion. Therefore, the issue was not res judicata and could be 
decided later. Utah Builders' Supply Co. v. Gardner, 86 Utah 
250, 39 P.2d 327, 103 A.L.R. 928 (19341; Hansen v. Mauss, 40 
Utah 361, 121 P.2d 605 (1912). 
In addition, another order was entered within 
ten days of the time the decree became final, effectively 
modifying the decree by reserving the issue of the final dis-
tribution of the proceeds of the home. This same reservation 
was contained in the May 17, 1982 order approving the sale of 
the home. 
Assuming that the bankruptcy court has juris-
diction to determine what will be done with all of the funds 
in the bankruptcy estate, that jurisdiction will not enable 
that court to determine what will be done with plaintiff's 
half of the proceeds, since that half represents her equitable 
interest, which interest is not part of the estate. 
(5) In view of the fact that plaintiff declared a 
homestead exemption affecting property to which she had legal 
title, which legal title was converted to an equitable interest, 
which was in turn converted to money in the possession of the 
bankruptcy trustee, that trustee holds those proceeds subject 
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to plaintiff's homestead exemption 
(6 l Since the decree which provided that legal tit le 
would be vested in defendant also provided that the creditors 
be paid first, the bankruptcy court will probably rely on that 
absent a ruling by the state court that there is an applicable 
homestead exemption. Master Lubricantsv. Cook, 159 F.2d 679 
(9th Cir. 19471. Although this case predates the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978, Section 6 of the old Bankruptcy Act apparently 
treated homestead exemptions the same way as the present Act, at 
least as to Utah residents. llU.S.C. §522(b). 
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Point 4. If the trial court validly decreed the 
the proceeds of the home be paid to creditors, it should have 
provided for the homestead exemption (Theory C). 
(l) As reviewed under Point 3 (1) , there is rationale 
that would justify the conclusion that the trial court had juris-
diction to allocate the property of the parties. 
(2) The decrees of the trial court might be read 
to have awarded an equitable interest in the home of the parties 
to certain creditors of the defendant. Thus, when legal title 
was vested in defendant, he would have held that title in trust 
not only in part for the benefit of plaintiff, but also in part 
for his creditors. 
Since defendant was in bankruptcy, property 
awarded to him became part of the bankrupt estate. The estate 
was essentially property held for the benefit of his creditors. 
Thus property awarded to him for the benefit of creditors would 
be treated the same as property just awarded to him. 
C3) When a party to a divorce is awarded the home of 
the parties, and files for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy court 
will determine the existance of a homestead exemption based upon 
the provisions of the divorce decree. Master Lubricants Co. v. 
Cook, 159 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1947); In re Scott, 12 B.R. 613, 
616 (W.D. Ok. 1981). 
(4) When the plaintiff filed her Declaration of 
Homestead, she owned the home in the sense necessary to file 
that declaration, since the decree awarding title to the property 
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to the defendant had not become final. Daly v. Daly, 533 P.2d. 
884 (Utah 1975). 
Even if the decree had been final, plaintiff's 
one-half equitable interest in the property would be subject to 
her claim of a homestead exemption. Panagopulos v. Manning, 
93 Utah 198, 69 P.2d 614 (1937). 
Therefore, there could not be any type of a 
forced sale which would result in plaintiff, or at least the 
parties, receiving less than the amount of the exemption 
declared. Section 78-23-3 Utah Code Annotated; Cleverly v. 
District Court of Second Judicial Dist., 85 Utah 440, 39 P.2d 
748 (1935). 
{_5) It is now necessary for the state court to 
allocate this exemption using the same power exercised in 
transferring title from plaintiff. 24 Am Jur 2d Divorce and 
Separation §931 at 1062. Closson v. Closson, 30 Wyo 1, 215 
P. 485, 29 A.L.R. 1371, 1377 (1923). 
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Point 5. It is equitable that the entire homestead 
be allocated to plaintiff. 
In plaintiff's Statement of Points and Authorities 
Relevant to the Homestead Exemption dated April 16, 1982, 
plaintiff set forth certain "Equitable Considerations" 
supporting the proposition that the homestead exemption should 
be allocated to the plaintiff. These included the following: 
(1) Despite being ordered to do so on March 9, 1981, 
defendant never made any monthiy payment of principal, interest, 
tax, and insurance on the residence (about $500.00 per month). 
(2) Plaintiff supported the two younger children of 
the parties with no hope for any help from the plaintiff after 
August 11, 1981. This is particularly pertinent since the 
homestead exemption is intended to be a means of support for the 
family. Kimball v. Salisbury, 17 Utah 381, 395, 53 P. 1037, 
1041 (1898). 
(31 Plaintiff brought the sum of $7,000 to the 
marriage which was used for the downpayment on the home. 
(4) Most of the debts were incurred solely for 
defendant's benefit and without plaintiff's knowledge. 
(5) The defendant received a disproportionately 
large share of the personal property of the parties. 
For any or all of these reasons, this Court should 
use the equitable powers to now allocate the entire homestead 
exemption to the plaintiff. 
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Respectfully submitled chis dcty of 
November, 1983. 
Former Attorney for Plaintiff 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that true and accurate copies (2) 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellant's Former Attorney were 
_,,_ 
delivered to the following on the of November, 1983. 
Kellie F. Williams 
142 East 200 South 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Jimi Mitsunaga 
731 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84021 
L;;:HIBIT A 
3646tib3 DECLARATION OF HOMESTEAD 
The undersigned, Susan Race, hereby claims a 
homestead in the property situate in the County of Salt Lake 
at 9653 South 2720 East, Sandy, Utah and more particularly 
described as follows: 
Beginning at a point which is North 0005•34• East 
884.88 feet and South 99059•32" East 165,86 feet 
from the West quarter corner of Section 11, Township 
3 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
(said point also being the i'orthwest corner of Lot 
301, Oakridge Heights No. 3), and running thence 
South 99055•00• East, along the North line of said 
Lot 301, 100.00 feet; thence North 0005•29• East 
97.10 feet, more or less, to the Southeast corner of 
property deeded to William D. Green, etux, by 
Warranty Deed recorded as Entry No. 2693849 in Book 
3814 at Page 247 of the Official Records; thence North 
99059•32• West along the South line of said property, 
100.00 feet, more or less, to the East line of 2720 
East Street; thence South 0005•34• West, along the East 
line of said Street 97.10 feet, more or less, to the 
point of beginning. 
The estimated cash value of said property is $40,000. 
U'resent' market value less contract balance.) 
The above-named claimant is residing at 1311 McKettrick 
Street in Wenatchee, Washington 98801, and is entitled to this 
homestead exemption as a head of family since she is married 
and to her best knowledge, information, and belief, her spouse 
has not filed a declaration of homestead. 
The amount of the homestead claimed is $11,500, in-
eluding $8,000 for the claimant as head of family, $2,000 for 
her spouse, Robert W. Race, age __ 9653 South 2720 East, 
Sandy, Utah 84092, and $1,500 for her three dependant children, 
one of which, Tamara Race, age 16, .lives at 2026 Woodglen Street, 
Simi Valley, California 93063, and the other two of which, 
Jeffrey Race, age I( __.!._i._• and Sharon Race, age 
with claimant at her address given above. 
DATED this __::;:__ day of ='. le c'f1'. 
SUSAN RACE 
____ , live 
• 1982. 
- L -
STATE OF WASHINGTON) 
I SS. 
County of Chelan ) 
On this ' day of 1982, personally 
appeared before me Susan Race, the signer' of the above instrllll'ent, 
who duly acknowledged to me that she executed the same, 
'> 
1 _,,. 1/-[;. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at , , .'d :a Li 
My Commission Expires: 
EXHIBIT A c<ge 2 
EXHIBIT B 
KEU.IE F. WILLIAMS 
Attorney for Petitioner 
SUSAN RACE HUNI'ER 
CORPORON & WillIAIB 
142 East 200 South, Ste 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
( 801) 328-1162 
IN IBE UNITIIl S'licrES BANKRUPTCY COURT, FOR TIIE 
DISTRICT OF lITAH, 
IN IBE MATIER OF 
ROBERT WWNE RACE. 
STATE OF lITAH 
ss. 
COUN'IY OF SALT IARE 
CENI'RAL DIVISION. 
AFFIDAVIT OF TRUSTEE, 
ANNA DRAKE. 
NJ. 81-01923 
COMES l'DW, ANNA DRAKE, as Trustee in Bankruptcy, and deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. That she has been and is the Trustee in Bankruptcy in the 
above-entitled matter. 
2. That she will not disburse any funds in this case until the 
Bankrupt' s divorce appeal, Case No .19146, has been determined by the 
Supreme O:lurt of Utah. 
DATED this ..JJ.}±_day of July, 1983. 
ANNA DRAKE 
EXHIBIT B page 1 
/ 
SUliSCRIBill AND SWORN to before me tl11s _L{__day or July, 1983. 
My CaIIIlission Expires: 
ITTI'ARY PUBLIC, Residing in 
Salt Lake Cotnty, Utah. 
